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Abstract—How can we make sense of sovereignty’s role in Supreme
Court personal jurisdiction doctrine? The Supreme Court has once again
raised this question with its plurality decision in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, which endorsed a personal jurisdiction doctrine based on
sovereign authority of forum states. Scholarly reaction to Nicastro has
largely been negative, as scholars argue both that, descriptively,
sovereignty considerations have long not played a role in personal
jurisdiction, and that, normatively, such considerations ought not play a
role in personal jurisdiction. This Note concerns only the former
contention, that sovereignty’s role in personal jurisdiction largely faded
after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. Contrary to recent scholarly opinion, the Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine has, from Pennoyer to Nicastro, always embraced a
robust consideration of states’ sovereign authority. Indeed, even
International Shoe, when considered in appropriate historical context,
shows the Court’s continued, albeit narrowed, respect for sovereign
authority. Thus, this Note argues that in order to clear up recent scholarly
confusion concerning sovereignty’s role in personal jurisdiction, we must
first understand that Nicastro represents a continuation, rather than an
unexpected revival, of sovereignty considerations bearing on personal
jurisdiction determinations.
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INTRODUCTION
With its recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a
plurality of the Supreme Court set afire the legal community with broad
proclamations of a sovereign-authority-based1 approach to personal
jurisdiction.2 The criticisms of that decision and its focus on sovereignty
range from impracticability3 to incomprehensibility.4 The main thrust of
these arguments is that sovereignty has no place in personal jurisdiction,
and that the Court said as much in its landmark International Shoe Co. v.
Washington decision.5 Accordingly, critics of Justice Kennedy’s plurality

1 State sovereignty refers generally to “[t]he right of a state to self-government” or “the supreme
authority exercised by each state.” State Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) (stating that
“whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it”).
3 Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41, 66, 68–
70 (2012).
4 Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2011); see also Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to
Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 760 (2012).
5 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)); see also Mona A. Lee, Comment, Burger King’s Bifurcated Test for Personal
Jurisdiction: The Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes Judicial Economy and Threatens a Defendant’s Due
Process Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 945, 963 (1993).
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in Nicastro cite it as an attempt to assert antiquated notions of sovereignty
that died out with International Shoe.6
The International Shoe Court’s statement that personal jurisdiction
should not be divorced from “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice”7 is not a rejection of sovereign-authority concerns in personal
jurisdiction doctrine. This Note will take up a descriptive exploration of
sovereignty concerns in the Supreme Court’s doctrine from Pennoyer v.
Neff8 to Nicastro,9 and argue that the Court has never abandoned its focus
on sovereign authority in the context of personal jurisdiction.
The Court’s sovereign-authority-based approach to personal
jurisdiction began in Pennoyer, where the Court asserted that the Due
Process Clause imposed strict territorial limits on the exercise of
jurisdiction.10 That marked the most extreme sovereignty rationale the
Court has yet to adopt in its personal jurisdiction decisions.11 However, in
the years to come, the Court created exceptions to that absolute doctrine in
order to allow states to exercise authority over out-of-state defendants who
had availed themselves of the benefits and protections of the state.12 This is
an oft-ignored development in the doctrine, but is important for
understanding it as a whole.
The most radical shift in the doctrine comes in International Shoe,
where the Court liberalized the sovereignty considerations in personal
jurisdiction, such that a defendant’s minimum contacts with a state give
that state the sovereign authority to exercise jurisdiction over that
defendant, even when no service of process is given to a representative
agent in the state.13 Reading Milliken v. Meyer,14 which first established the
notion of fair play and substantial justice as a relevant consideration in

6 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263 (“[Nicastro’s] plurality opinion was nothing short of a
bull-headed attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in a sovereignty theory.”); Wendy Collins Perdue,
What’s “Sovereignty” Got To Do With It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court,
63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 734, 739–40 (2012).
7 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
8 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
10 95 U.S. at 722, 733–34.
11 Cf. Nicholas R. Spampata, Note, King Pennoyer Dethroned: A Policy-Analysis-Influenced Study
of the Limits of Pennoyer v. Neff in the Jurisdictional Environment of the Internet, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1742, 1746–47 (2000) (describing Pennoyer as placing “the minimum floor too high” such that “the
federal courts were forced to stretch Pennoyer’s sovereignty principle” (citations omitted)).
12 See infra note 38.
13 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
14 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)).
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personal jurisdiction,15 and International Shoe together makes clear that
even International Shoe’s liberal minimum contacts test is still
fundamentally a test of whether or not a forum state has the sovereign
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
The Court fought with the boundaries of the minimum contacts test for
decades after International Shoe, culminating most recently with its
decision in Nicastro. After the plurality in Nicastro made broad assertions
of sovereignty considerations when considering whether the state could
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant,16 the legal community rained down
much criticism.17 This Note argues that this criticism is misplaced because
the history of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine has
always focused on sovereign authority.
As a general matter, at least descriptively, the Court is not “bullheaded”18 or incoherent19 in applying its personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Primarily, it is important to understand the descriptive coherence of the
Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine because the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is inherently concerned with the legitimate exercise of judicial
power over parties to litigation.20 Thus, if the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine is inconsistent or incoherent, it calls into question the
legitimacy of many judicial proceedings and exercises of power. In fact, the
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is descriptively coherent,
thus helping to alleviate concerns about the legitimacy of judicial exercises
of personal jurisdiction.
Part I details the background of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine and its sovereignty concerns, ending with a discussion
of the Court’s recent decision in Nicastro. Part II describes some of the
criticisms of the Court’s sovereignty-based approach to personal
jurisdiction in Nicastro, especially those asserting the incoherence of the
Court’s doctrine throughout history. Part III provides an overarching
historical account of the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine, synthesizing

15 While both the phrases “fair play” and “substantial justice” appear separately in a previous
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decision, McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91–92, the Court did not
explicitly consider “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . [as] implicit in due
process” until its decision in Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added). See infra note 41.
16 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hether a judicial judgment is lawful
depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.”).
17 See Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263; Noyes, supra note 3, at 66, 68–70; Perdue, supra note 6, at
734, 739–40; Stravitz, supra note 4, at 760.
18 Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263.
19 Perdue, supra note 6, at 740.
20 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion) (first citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); and then citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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its decisions from Pennoyer to Nicastro, and dispelling the notion that the
Court has applied inconsistent rationales for its personal jurisdiction
doctrine. Rather, Part III argues, personal jurisdiction has always concerned
itself with the sovereign authority of forum states. Further, Part III
addresses the scholarly criticisms of the Court’s use of sovereignty notions
in Nicastro and other cases, arguing that sovereignty is in fact the correct
way in which to think about personal jurisdiction, at least descriptively.
I.

BACKGROUND

First, this Part explores the introduction of due process into personal
jurisdiction and the severe territorial limitations the Court laid down in
Pennoyer. Second, it traces the exceptions the Court made to that doctrine
leading up to Milliken and International Shoe. Third, this Part explores the
progeny of International Shoe, and showcases the vein of sovereignty
considerations that runs through these cases. Finally, this Part describes in
detail the Court’s recent Nicastro decision.
A. Sovereignty’s Early Beginnings in Personal Jurisdiction
The story of sovereignty in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine begins with its much-disparaged decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.21 In
that case, the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause “as a limitation on
the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting the rights or
interests of nonresident defendants.”22 This decision “cemented the physical
power doctrine in this country,” such that “[w]ithout physical presence, a
state was powerless over a civil defendant.”23
Pennoyer began with an attorney, Mitchell, filing an action against a
former client, Neff, for less than $300 in fees.24 Because Neff was not a
resident of Oregon, but had property in Oregon, Mitchell utilized an
Oregon statute authorizing “constructive service” via publication.25
Because Neff did not appear, default judgment was granted for Mitchell
21 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 313 (1956) (“The
Pennoyer rule is on the way out, having reached the end of its brief usefulness.”); Spampata, supra note
11, at 1757 (stating that “[t]he primary criticisms of the Pennoyer theory is that it reaches ‘wrong’
results and that it is based on flawed concepts that should have no place in jurisdictional law” (citations
omitted)); Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON
HALL L. REV. 75, 76 (1997) (stating that Pennoyer “obliterated generations of law on the right of a
sovereign to control property within its territory”).
22 Barbara Surtees Goto, International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Resurrects
the Physical Power Theory, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851, 856 (1991).
23 Id.
24 95 U.S. at 719.
25 Id. at 719–20.
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and Neff’s property was sold at a sheriff’s sale.26 Neff later returned to
Oregon after Pennoyer had come into possession of the land and challenged
the validity of the Oregon state court’s judgment, arguing it improperly
asserted jurisdiction over him.27
Upholding the lower court’s finding that Mitchell’s service was
invalid, the Court started with the general premise that “[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established.”28 Elaborating further on its theory of personal
jurisdiction, the Court laid down two principles: first, that “every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory,” and second, “that no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”29
Thus, the Court stated that in personam jurisdiction required either
that the defendant was served while present in the forum, or the defendant
voluntarily appeared in the forum.30 The Court further stated that in rem
jurisdiction could be attained for out-of-state persons, so long as they had
property within the forum state that could be attached at the time of suit.31
The Court held that the judgment in the Oregon state court against
Neff could not be justified.32 There was no in personam jurisdiction
because Neff was not served in state and did not voluntarily appear in the
state courts.33 Further, there was no in rem jurisdiction because Neff’s
property was not attached at the outset of the litigation.34
This understanding of Pennoyer is essential to understanding the
Court’s overall framework of sovereignty concerns in its personal
jurisdiction doctrine. Going forward, the Court certainly did not adhere to
its strict focus on territorial limitations when considering personal
jurisdiction limitations more generally.35 However, if nothing else,
Pennoyer represents the Supreme Court’s first assertion that due process
plays a meaningful limiting role in personal jurisdiction.36

26

Id.
Id. at 721–22.
28 Id. at 720.
29 Id. at 722.
30 Id. at 724–25.
31 Id. at 723 (stating that “[e]very State owes protection to its own citizens” and thus has “authority
to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens”).
32 Id. at 734.
33 Id. at 733–34.
34 Id. at 734.
35 See infra Sections I.B–D.
36 95 U.S. at 733; see also Perdue, supra note 6, at 731.
27
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B. Milliken, International Shoe, and McGee: A Revitalized SovereigntyBased Approach to Personal Jurisdiction
The sovereignty-based proclamations of Pennoyer reigned supreme in
personal jurisdiction doctrine for over half a century, though not without
complaint.37 After Pennoyer, the Court slowly carved out exceptions to its
“transient” commitment,38 but did not waiver in its commitment to an
authority-based approach to personal jurisdiction. Namely, the Court
carved out some exceptions to the absolute territorial limits for corporate
out-of-state defendants who had gained the benefits of a state but were not
residents of the state. In those circumstances, the Court held that the states
had sovereign authority in a functional sense. For example, in Milliken v.
Meyer, the Court considered whether personal service of process to an instate resident while that resident was out of the forum state was sufficient
for an assertion of personal jurisdiction.39 The Court held that it was, stating
that the “the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . .
implicit in due process [were] satisfied” because “the authority of a state
over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence
from the state.”40
Milliken is incredibly important in hindsight, because it is the first
appearance of the phrase “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice,”41 which would go on to become famous in International Shoe.42
However, the literature on personal jurisdiction neglects Milliken.43

37

See Ehrenzweig, supra note 21, at 290–91.
See Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1914); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co.
of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913); Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S.
245, 256–57 (1909); Pa. Lumbermen’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 418–19 (1905);
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610 (1899); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355, 360
(1882) (denying jurisdiction but stating that because a corporation’s “officers and agents constitute all
that is visible of its existence[] and they may be authorized to act for it without as well as within the
state,” there is “no sound reason why, to the extent of their agency, they should not be equally deemed
to represent it in the states for which they are respectively appointed when it is called to legal
responsibility for their transactions”).
39 311 U.S. 457, 459 (1940).
40 Id. at 463.
41 Id. (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)). The Court in McDonald used the phrases
“fair play” and “substantial justice,” but not in the same formulation that later appeared in Milliken.
McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91–92.
42 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
43 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990) (making no mention of
Milliken); Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5 (1989)
(making no mention of Milliken); Joshua M. Wesneski, Note, Finding Federalism in Waiver of
Personal Jurisdiction: Federalism and Individual Rights in the Second Circuit, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
225, 228 n.11, 228 n.17 (2013) (mentioning Milliken only via its citations to International Shoe and to a
law review article).
38
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Because of that, it is worth considering the context in which the phrase
arose. The Court in Milliken found that the exercise of jurisdiction did not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because the
state was properly exercising its sovereign authority over the defendant.44
The negative implication of that statement is that if the state exercised
jurisdiction over the defendant without proper authority to do so, it would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Those
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice may help to clarify
what exactly the International Shoe Court had in mind.
Next came the Court’s landmark decision International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.45 International Shoe Company, a manufacturer and seller of
footwear, was sued in the Washington state courts.46 International Shoe had
no office and made no contracts in Washington, but had roughly a dozen
salesmen who resided there, took orders there, and then had shoes shipped
into Washington.47 After being subjected to jurisdiction in the state courts
of Washington, International Shoe argued that “its activities within the state
were not sufficient to manifest its ‘presence’ there” and thus the
Washington state courts could not assert jurisdiction over it.48
Citing its decision in Milliken, the Court stated that due process in the
context of personal jurisdiction required only that, when the defendant was
not present in the forum state, the defendant have “certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”49 The Court
asserted that since corporations do not have “presence” in a state in the
same way that an individual may be physically present in a state, “the state
of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it.”50 Presence of a corporation in a state
may be evidenced by activities that are “continuous and systematic . . .
[and] give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued
or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.”51
Additionally, the Court noted that single or isolated actions in a state
by a corporation do not automatically “confer upon the state authority to

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
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Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 315.
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Id. at 317 (citing, inter alia, St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882)).
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enforce it,” though depending on the nature of such actions they may.52 The
Court held that Washington’s exercise of jurisdiction was “reasonable and
just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice,” because International Shoe’s activities in Washington were
“systematic and continuous,” were such that it “received the benefits and
protection of the laws of the state,” and the suit arose out of those
activities.53 That is, in light of Milliken, the Court’s reasoning was that
Washington could properly exercise jurisdiction, consistent with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice, because International Shoe’s
contacts with Washington gave the state the sovereign authority necessary
to exercise jurisdiction.
The Court in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. fully
embraced the liberal minimum contacts standard it laid down twelve years
prior in International Shoe.54 McGee had won a judgment against
International Life Insurance Company in California, though International
Life Insurance Company was located in Texas.55 International Life
Insurance Company received service via mail at its Texas office.56 The
Court upheld California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Texas company
because it was “sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was
based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.”57
McGee is the Court’s most liberal, and surprisingly conveniencefocused, application of the minimum contacts test. In support of its holding,
the Court cited the facts that the contract between McGee and International
Life Insurance Company was administered within California, McGee sent
insurance premiums from California to the insurance company, and that
McGee was a resident of California.58 The Court focused primarily on the
potential inconvenience to California citizens and California’s interest “in
providing effective means of redress for its residents.”59 In International
Shoe, the Court stated that when determining whether minimum contacts
had been satisfied, “[a]n ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
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place of business is relevant.”60 That is, the International Shoe Court
discussed inconvenience only in the context of a forum state exercising
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who would be pulled away from its
home or place of business and forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum.61
Though that is the only mention of inconvenience considerations in
International Shoe,62 the Court in McGee found potential inconveniences to
plaintiffs to be persuasive enough to sustain minimum contacts with only a
single contractual contact in a state.63 Thus, the Court implicitly held that a
single contractual relationship with the resident of the state, in conjunction
with the state’s interest in ensuring a convenient forum in which its
residents may seek redress for wrongs, gives rise to the authority necessary
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction.64
C. Refocusing on Sovereignty
As evidenced by the preceding discussion of the Court’s decisions in
Milliken, International Shoe, and McGee, the Supreme Court abandoned
the strict territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction, but retained a more
relaxed rationale for personal jurisdiction limitations still rooted in the
sovereign authority of potential forum states.65 The Court quickly followed
up those decisions with an explicit acknowledgment of that rationale in
Hanson v. Denckla,66 and expounded on its reasons for relaxing the
sovereignty limits to personal jurisdiction imposed on states.67
1. Hanson v. Denckla.—Just a year after applying the minimum
contacts test in a most liberal fashion in McGee, the Court elaborated on its
underlying view of personal jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test.68
The Court noted that “[a]s technological progress . . . increased the flow of
commerce between States,” the personal jurisdiction standard evolved from
the “rigid” Pennoyer rule to the more “flexible” minimum contacts
standard from International Shoe.69 However, the Court insisted that the
restrictions on state courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction “are more than
60 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930)).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
64 Id. at 223–24.
65 See id.; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940).
66 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 251.
69 Id. at 250–51.
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a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation”; rather,
“[t]hey are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States.”70 That is, the Court reasserted that the underlying
rationale for its personal jurisdiction doctrine is a focus on the sovereign
authority of the courts attempting to exercise their jurisdiction in any
particular case.
2. World-Wide Volkswagen, Bauxites, and Burger King.—The
Court’s continued focus on sovereignty in its personal jurisdiction doctrine
is apparent in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.71 In that case,
the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle from a Volkswagen dealership in New
York, and later left New York to move across the country in the car.72 As
they drove through Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were struck by another
vehicle, resulting in a fire that severely injured several of the family
members.73 The plaintiffs brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma
against World-Wide Volkswagen, the regional distributor of their vehicle.74
Seemingly aware that the nature of its personal jurisdiction doctrine
was in flux since the relaxation of territorial limitations in Milliken and
International Shoe,75 the Court attempted to clarify the doctrine by stating
what it thought to be the two functions of the minimum contacts test: (1) to
“protect[] the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum,” and (2) “to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”76 Elaborating further on that
second point, the Court stated that a focus on sovereign authority in the
exercise of personal jurisdiction was necessary to “remain faithful to the
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution,” because
the “Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.”77
The Court’s sweeping statements about the necessity of sovereignty
considerations in personal jurisdiction make its later decision in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee particularly

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 251.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section I.B.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 293–94.
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striking.78 There, the Court stated that “[t]he personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but
as a matter of individual liberty.”79
Recognizing that two years prior in World-Wide Volkswagen it had
reasserted the importance of sovereignty in the personal jurisdiction sphere,
the Bauxites Court provided a short explanation of its new statement on
individual liberty. The Court asserted that “[t]he restriction on state
sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause.”80 That is, the Court did not abandon notions of
sovereign authority, but rather expounded on how it should be considered:
sovereign authority of the forum is required for personal jurisdiction over a
potential defendant,81 and the determination of whether there is sovereign
authority—such that exercising jurisdiction would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice—depends on the extent to which
that potential defendant has put itself in contact with the forum state.82
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court refined the minimum
contacts test so that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if
the defendant “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of “the benefits and
protections” of the forum’s laws.83 After making that determination, the
Court held that it might then look to secondary considerations and
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comported with “fair play
and substantial justice.”84 Those secondary considerations include any
burden to the defendant, the state’s interest in having the suit litigated in its
courts, any inconvenience to the plaintiff, adjudicatory efficiency from the
court’s perspective, and the “shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”85
In Burnham v. Superior Court, the Court began its discussion of
personal jurisdiction by asserting once again that it had “long relied on the
principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the
territorial limits of each State’s authority.”86 Unlike many cases since
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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456 U.S. 694 (1982).
Id. at 702.
Id. at 702 n.10.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292–93.
Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
Id. at 476 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990).
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Milliken and International Shoe, Burnham concerned a defendant who was
physically present in the state at the time of service.87 Upholding the
exercise of jurisdiction, the Court stated, “jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”88 These cases show
that, though the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis certainly evolved, the
core of sovereign authority was ever present in its analyses.
D. Nicastro: The Capstone of Sovereignty in Contemporary Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine
Thus far in the historical journey through personal jurisdiction
decisions in the Supreme Court, one thing is evident: sovereignty never
left. This Section now analyzes a key contemporary Supreme Court
personal jurisdiction case, Nicastro.89 Because this plurality decision gave
rise to a serious amount of criticism,90 an in-depth analysis of the differing
opinions in Nicastro is necessary.
Nicastro arose from a New Jersey state court products liability suit.91
The plaintiff in New Jersey was using a metal-shearing machine made by
the defendant in England, and seriously injured his hand in the process.92
The question before the court was whether the New Jersey state courts
could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre Machinery,
even though the company had not shipped its goods to or marketed in New
Jersey.93
The defendant manufactured the machine in England, and then a thirdparty company sold the defendant’s machines throughout the United
States.94 While the defendant’s employees attended conventions in the
United States, along with the third-party distribution company, to market
its machines, those conventions were not in New Jersey.95 At most, four,
but possibly only one, J. McIntyre machine ended up in New Jersey.96
Further, “J. McIntyre held both United States and European patents on its

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 610.
Id. at 619.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
See infra Part II.
131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recycling technology,” and the distributor was given guidance by the
defendant on how to advertise and sell the machines.97
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that its state courts could
properly assert personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre, consistent with the
Due Process Clause, since
the injury occurred in New Jersey; because petitioner knew or reasonably
should have known “that its products are distributed through a nationwide
distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the
fifty states”; and because petitioner failed to “take some reasonable step to
prevent the distribution of its products in [New Jersey].”98

The United States Supreme Court began with a general discussion of
personal jurisdiction.99 The Court reiterated the American personal
jurisdiction maxim that a court may only properly exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant has the requisite amount
of contacts with the relevant sovereign, “such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”100 The amount of defendant contacts required to assert
jurisdiction, though impossible to quantify uniformly across all contexts, is
the amount of contacts required for the defendant to gain the “benefits and
protections” of the state’s laws.101 However, the Court noted, “[f]reeform
notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot
transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law.”102 That
is, the plurality forcefully embraced the notion that “fairness,” as it has
been used by the Court in its personal jurisdiction doctrine, is inextricably
linked to the sovereign authority of the court attempting to assert personal
jurisdiction.
The Court stated such purposeful availment could occur in a number
of different ways.103 For example, a defendant could consent to the state’s
jurisdiction, be served within the state’s territorial borders at the time of the
suit, reside in the state, be incorporated in the state, or have its primary
business presence in the state.104 In each of those circumstances, the
plurality wrote, the defendant’s conduct has properly implied the intent to
derive some benefit from the state and, so, the intent to be subject to the
97

Id.
Id. (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010)).
99 Id. at 2787.
100 Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
101 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
98
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jurisdiction of the state in adjudicatory proceedings.105 That is, when a
defendant has activities that are connected to a state, “it submits to the
judicial power of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is
exercised in connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the
State.”106
The plurality then argued that Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court107 was an incorrect application of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine because it applied the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine such
that general fairness considerations—rather than fairness considerations
grounded in sovereign authority—could justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.108 For example, Justice Brennan’s
concurrence argued that personal jurisdiction may be properly exercised
when a defendant merely puts something in the “stream of commerce” and
knows that it is being marketed in the forum state, because the defendant
cannot be surprised that a lawsuit was filed there and thus the fairness
considerations of personal jurisdiction are met.109
Justice Brennan was wrong, the Nicastro plurality argued, because
personal jurisdiction, which is concerned with the legitimate wielding of
judicial power, requires more than general fairness.110 Rather, the plurality
contended that authority must be the basis of a proper assertion of personal
jurisdiction because, otherwise, a defendant that has not purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of the forum state’s laws may be subjected to
its jurisdiction—even though the forum state lacks any sovereign authorial
basis for exercising that power.111 If a court’s personal jurisdiction
determination was based merely on general fairness considerations, “a lack
of purposeful availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial
procedures could otherwise protect the defendant’s interests, or where the
plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign
forum.”112 This, the plurality explained, is not the case.113 Instead, the
105

Id.
Id. at 2787–88.
107 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Asahi concerned “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign
defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes ‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant
and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
108 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
109 Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
110 Id. at 2789.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)).
106
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plurality agreed with Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi, which
stated, “The ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum
State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”114
The plurality next reasoned that two principles are implicit in its
authority-based view of jurisdiction.115 First, courts’ personal jurisdiction
determinations must be made on an individual basis, such that in each
circumstance a court must determine whether the particular sovereign has
sufficient sovereign authority over the particular defendant to justify the
court exercising personal jurisdiction.116 That is, courts must first ask if “a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or
economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the
sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment concerning
that conduct.”117 Second, the plurality maintained that, though a foreign
defendant may be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in general,
that does not necessarily mean that it is subject to the jurisdiction of
individual states.118
The plurality next moved on to consider the personal jurisdiction
doctrine as applied to the case at hand.119 The plurality stated that there was
insufficient proof that J. McIntyre had purposefully directed its actions at
New Jersey.120 Though J. McIntyre may have intended to deal in the United
States, as evidenced by its relationship with a third-party distributor in the
United States and attendance at trade fairs in the United States, those
actions were insufficient to establish that J. McIntyre had purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and protections of New Jersey’s laws.121 That
is, J. McIntyre’s conduct did not properly imply an intent to benefit from
the protection of New Jersey’s laws, such that New Jersey had the authority
to exercise personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre consistent with the Due
Process Clause and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.122

114
115
116
117
118
119
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II. RECENT CRITICISM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the wake of Nicastro, there has been a slew of criticism of the
Supreme Court’s contemporary personal jurisdiction doctrine.123 In general,
the criticism centers on the relationship of those decisions to the landmark
decision in International Shoe. This Section will detail some normative
criticisms of the Court’s doctrine and the confusion they add to the
discussion, while Section III.D will respond to those criticisms.
For example, consider Patrick Borchers’s criticism of the
contemporary Supreme Court.124 Borchers criticizes Nicastro as “a bullheaded attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in a sovereignty theory.”125
He argues that the plurality completely missed the most important
statement of International Shoe, i.e., for a defendant to be subject to
personal jurisdiction “he [must] have certain minimum contacts with [the
State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”126
This misunderstanding on the part of the Court is on full display,
Borchers argues, when they criticize courts, including the Asahi Court, for
using general notions of fairness, rather than fairness considerations guided
by a sovereignty inquiry, to make personal jurisdiction decisions.127
Borchers and Perdue both respond to this concern by asserting that is in
fact what the International Shoe Court intended: a shift away from
sovereignty considerations to general fairness considerations.128 Indeed, as
Justice Black stated, “it is unthinkable that the vague due process clause
was ever intended to prohibit a State from regulating or taxing a business
carried on within its boundaries simply because this is done by agents of a
corporation organized and having its headquarters elsewhere.”129 Thus, by
completely rewriting the history of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine and invoking a decision based on sovereignty, it would be more

123 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263; Noyes, supra note 3, at 41 (arguing that for the
second time in 25 years “personal jurisdiction has perplexed the U.S. Supreme Court”); John T. Parry,
Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities Of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre
Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 841 (2012) (describing the Court’s decision in
Nicastro as “compound[ing] the uncertainty” in its contemporary personal jurisdiction doctrine);
Perdue, supra note 6, at 729 (stating that “[s]omething about personal jurisdiction seems to bring out
the worst in the Supreme Court”).
124 Borchers, supra note 4.
125 Id. at 1263.
126 Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
127 Id. at 1263–64 (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011)
(plurality opinion)).
128 Id. at 1263; Perdue, supra note 6, at 735.
129 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.).
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legitimate, Borchers argues, to simply overrule International Shoe and its
successors.130
Though particularly illustrative of the kinds of criticisms lobbed at the
Supreme Court in recent years, Borchers’s article is not alone. For
example, Perdue argues that the move away from Pennoyer’s “state-based
analytic approach” was most importantly a “shift that put the defendant
rather than the state at the center of the jurisdictional inquiry,” and
contrasts that against Justice Kennedy’s “strong embrace of the language of
sovereignty in Nicastro.”131 Further, John Parry argues that the Court’s
decision in Nicastro “compounds the uncertainty” in the Supreme Court’s
personal jurisdiction doctrine.132 These criticisms largely focus on the idea
that the Court cannot decide once and for all what the central principle at
play in personal jurisdiction is, and what role, if any, sovereignty should
play. In the coming Part, this Note argues that sovereignty has always had a
central role in the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction doctrine, which is clear
once we look to the historical development of the doctrine.
III. MAKING SENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY
As a normative matter, it is unclear whether concerns about state
sovereignty and authority should drive the Supreme Court’s view of
personal jurisdiction limits. The resounding answer from the legal
community, both recently and in years past, seems to be that it should
not.133 However, in searching for a way to understand the normative
justifications, or lack thereof, for the Court’s insistence on focusing its
personal jurisdiction doctrine on sovereignty considerations, it seems that
the legal community has added more confusion to the descriptive account
of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine than is necessary.
When considered in light of the Supreme Court’s historical approach to
personal jurisdiction, it is not at all surprising that sovereignty continues to
play a role in personal jurisdiction. Understanding this historical context is
essential to parsing the allegedly confounding approach to personal
jurisdiction the Court has taken in recent years.
130

Borchers, supra note 4, at 1264.
Perdue, supra note 6, at 734, 740, 742 (stating that “[o]f the three [Nicastro] opinions, Justice
Kennedy’s puts the most apparent reliance on sovereignty and federalism, but it uses them least
persuasively”).
132 Parry, supra note 123, at 841.
133 See Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A
Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 452–53 (1981); Perdue, supra note 6, at 743; Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112,
1120–33 (1981) (using a historical analysis of due process to argue that sovereignty and federalism
concerns are not properly part of the Due Process Clause limitations on personal jurisdiction).
131
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A. From Pennoyer to Milliken: The Carving Out of Territorial Limits
Understanding the shift from Pennoyer to Milliken is essential to
making sense of the role of sovereignty in the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine. In the years since the Pennoyer decision, the Court
has carved out some exceptions for corporate defendants to the principle
“that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory.”134 For example, in St. Clair v. Cox, the Court
stated that a foreign corporation could be subjected to jurisdiction when an
agent representing the corporation was served in Michigan.135 The Court
further stated that jurisdiction was proper when such corporation had
gained the protections afforded by the state’s laws, was able to conduct its
business within the state effectively, and was able to itself make use of the
state’s court system.136 In such situations, it would only be fair to ensure
that corporations could be brought into court for liabilities obtained within
the state.137
In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, the Court stated
three requirements for exercising jurisdiction over an out-of-state
corporation.138 First, the Court required that the out-of-state corporation
conducted business within the borders of the state where the corporation’s
agent was served to commence the suit.139 Second, the Court required that
the out-of-state corporation’s business within the borders of the state “was
transacted or managed by some agent or officer appointed by or
representing the corporation in such State.”140 Third, the Court required that
the state or locality had subjected the out-of-state corporate defendant to a
law that rendered its ability to do business conditional, either explicitly or
implicitly, on the corporation being eligible for suit in the state.141
Further, the Court has also rejected the notion that a state may not
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over “corporations carrying on
business within the State which is wholly of an interstate commerce
character.”142 Thus, in the time between Pennoyer and Milliken, the Court
recognized that the absolute territorial limits imposed by Pennoyer would
134
135
136
137
138

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
106 U.S. 350, 359 (1882).
Id. at 355.
Id.
172 U.S. 602, 618 (1899) (citing United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17, 35 (S.D. Ohio

1886)).
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id.
Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 588 (1914).
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not accurately capture the amount of authority a state may have over an
out-of-state corporation. That is, the Court held that a corporation might be
considered functionally within a state so long as it is doing business within
that state.
Given the Court’s development of corporate exceptions to the
Pennoyer doctrine and its characterization of sovereign authority to
exercise jurisdiction as comporting with the requirements of fair play and
substantial justice in Milliken,143 it is not shocking that the Court in
International Shoe held that certain “minimum contacts” would give a state
proper authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
corporation.144 Indeed, the Court’s statement that “the state of [a
corporation’s] origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its
behalf by those who are authorized to act for it,”145 is very consistent with
its Pennoyer-era decisions concerning corporate exceptions to its absolute
territorial limits doctrine. The real shift in personal jurisdiction doctrine
was not that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”146
supplanted Pennoyer’s reign; rather, the shift was that the Court now
allowed jurisdiction to be exercised over out-of-state corporations “even
though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service
of process has been given.”147 That is, the Court broadened the criteria laid
down in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance for when a state may properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, but it left
unaltered its holding in Milliken that authority over a defendant allows a
state to assert personal jurisdiction only if it does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”148
B. From International Shoe to Nicastro: Figuring Out the Boundaries of
Minimum Contacts
International Shoe’s expansion of corporate exceptions to the personal
jurisdiction doctrine is consistent with the Court’s cumulative recognition
that most business is now conducted nationwide by corporations that are
foreign to most states in which they actually conduct business.149 Thus,

143

See supra Section I.B.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
145 Id.
146 Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
147 Id. at 317 (citing, inter alia, St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882)); see also Redish, supra
note 133, at 1116–17.
148 Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
149 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317–18; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476 (1985) (stating that “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial
144
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“some fair and reasonable means should exist for bringing such
corporations within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State where the
business was done, out of which the dispute arises.”150 That is, while the
Court is still concerned with whether a state has authority over a defendant
such that it comports with notions of fair play and justice, the way in which
that authority may be gained has been liberalized to adjust to modern
corporate defendants. Thus, the Court in International Shoe needed,
arguably, to rid itself of the service of process to a representative agent
requirement so that it could fairly bring International Shoe, which was
doing a great deal of business in Washington with an elaborate scheme to
keep its agents out of the state, under the authority of the state. To do so,
the Court had to abolish the second principle of Pennoyer, i.e., that no state
may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant not within its borders.151 By
abolishing that requirement, it could fairly bring under the authority of
Washington’s state courts a corporate defendant who was availing itself of
the benefits of Washington’s laws.
Understood in this way, International Shoe truly marks an age of
applying the corporate exceptions to modern corporations in a rapidly
changing United States economy. In McGee, the Court applied what may
be its most liberal characterization of what gives a state authority over a
corporate defendant.152 Applying the minimum contacts considerations of
International Shoe, the Court held that a single contractual obligation
within California was significant enough to subject the defendant to
California’s authority because the inconvenience to the state’s citizen was
so great in that case.153 Though a strikingly liberal application of the
minimum contacts test, it can be understood by considering the Court’s
novel problem: a resident of California would otherwise be forced to
litigate a claim in Texas, far away from its home. This was a novel
economic concept, and considering that the defendant was deriving at least
some benefit from contracting with a California defendant, combined with
the plaintiff’s inconvenient situation based on novel economic
circumstances, it is at least defensible that California could exercise
personal jurisdiction and comport with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Retrospectively, of course, this exercise of personal
jurisdiction looks consistent with the Court’s view of how a sovereign can
amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted”).
150 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 619 (1899).
151 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
152 See 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957). See generally supra Section I.B.
153 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223–24.
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gain sovereign authority over a defendant. That is, by contracting with a
California citizen, the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and protections of California’s courts, such that it could properly
subject the citizen to suit within California.154
Given that understanding of International Shoe and McGee, the
Court’s proclamation in Denckla that restrictions on a state’s ability to
exercise personal jurisdiction “are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of the respective States”155 is much more easily understood.
That is, though the Court liberalized the requirements of sovereign
authority for the purposes of personal jurisdiction based on the unique
economic circumstances states faced with regard to a growing number of
out-of-state corporate defendants, it never rejected the notion that
sovereignty has been a central component of personal jurisdiction analysis
since Pennoyer.
One of the more frustrating decisions adding to the confusion
concerning sovereignty’s role in personal jurisdiction doctrine is
Bauxites.156 As discussed above,157 in that case, the Court stated that “[t]he
personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter
of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”158 Thus, it noted that
“[t]he restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.”159
However, this statement solidified personal jurisdiction’s sovereignty core.
That is, the Court merely noted that the reason we care about the limits of
the forum’s sovereign authority is to ensure that a forum does not
improperly exercise its authority over an individual and thereby violate the
individual’s liberty interests. In this way, the Court did highlight that the
focus of determining whether a state has sovereign authority such that it
can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant is on the individual to be
subjected to the court’s jurisdiction,160 but did not abandon its historically
consistent focus on sovereign authority generally.
This cumulative understanding of International Shoe’s innovations
also helps to explain the somewhat confusing Burger King case. In Burger
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
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King, the Court held that, when determining whether a court has the
authority to properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the court must
first look to whether the defendant had “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of the
“benefits and protections” of the forum state’s laws,161 such that it could
seek protection of its interests by resorting to the adjudicatory forums of
the state, and then to whether traditional notions of “fair play and
substantial justice” were satisfied by allowing an assertion of personal
jurisdiction.162 Though this two-step analysis seems confusing at first, it is
in fact in line with the Court’s historical approach to personal jurisdiction.
As the corporate exceptions to the Pennoyer absolute territorial limits
doctrine developed, the Court looked first to whether it could expand
jurisdictional authority over defendants who were “doing business” within
a foreign state.163 However, in order to reconcile its developing personal
jurisdiction doctrine with emerging economic trends, the Court liberalized
its personal jurisdiction doctrine by abolishing the requirement that a
representative of the corporation must be served within the state’s
boundaries.164 That is, the Court allowed states to properly exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even when a
representative of that defendant was not served within the forum state’s
borders, so long as the defendant maintained a sufficient amount of
contacts to justify the forum’s sovereign authority.165
The Burger King purposeful availment requirement is merely a more
concise conception of minimum contacts: when a defendant has maintained
contacts with a forum state that allow that defendant to seek the protection
and benefits of the forum state’s laws and adjudicatory bodies, the
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to establish
the state’s sovereign authority over it.166 Thus, Burger King’s two-step
analysis follows the natural order of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine: first, what are the corporation’s contacts with the state, and
second, are there fairness considerations (e.g., new economic
considerations) that could affect the Court’s application of the doctrine.
As the preceding discussion shows, considerations of sovereignty have
been at the core of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine since

161

471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
Id. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
163 See Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610 (1899); see also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 359 (1882) (highlighting
as relevant whether a corporation has “engaged in business in the State”).
164 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17.
165 Id.
166 471 U.S. at 475–76.
162
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Pennoyer. Though the Court has expanded the circumstances in which it
will consider a state to have sovereign authority such that it may exercise
personal jurisdiction, the question of whether the forum state has sufficient
sovereign authority is still the central focus of the inquiry. Understood in
this way, much of the confusion of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine stems from factual applications of the doctrine that are
jarring at first glance. However, as the historical analysis shows, emerging
economic trends have largely driven the changes in personal jurisdiction
and, because they have been so frequent in the last one hundred years, often
result in novel and difficult-to-understand applications of the long-standing
sovereignty concerns.
C. Using a Historical Approach to Understanding Nicastro
This historical understanding of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine and its focus on sovereignty helps to explain the
purportedly perplexing opinions in Nicastro. The plurality opinion in
Nicastro correctly reaffirmed that sovereign authority was the main focus
of the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis.167 Further, the plurality
correctly dismissed the idea that personal jurisdiction may be based solely
on general notions of fairness, untethered to sovereign authority
considerations.168 Accordingly, given the Court’s historical insistence that a
defendant have some contacts with a state in order to justify that state’s
exercise of authority over the defendant via personal jurisdiction,169 the
Court correctly held that New Jersey could not exercise its authority over
J. McIntyre when it had zero contacts with the state that could support a
finding that the corporation “purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey
market.”170 Indeed, even the most extreme application of the Court’s
liberalized personal jurisdiction doctrine required the defendant have at
least one contractual connection with the forum state, such that the
defendant could avail itself of the benefits and protections of the forum
state.171 Thus, it would have been improper for the Court in Nicastro to
consider general notions of fairness, e.g., inconvenience to the plaintiff,
when the defendant had not established any contacts with New Jersey that

167

See 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–88 (2011) (plurality opinion) (first citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319;
and then citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
168 See id. at 2789.
169 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
170 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (plurality opinion).
171 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957).
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could plausibly be construed as the defendant availing itself of the benefits
and protections of New Jersey’s laws.172
This explanation of Nicastro is simple in light of the Supreme Court’s
personal jurisdiction doctrinal development. First, consider the proposition
that sovereign authority is at the center of assertions of personal
jurisdiction. From Pennoyer to International Shoe and beyond, the only
thing that changed about the Supreme Court’s use of sovereignty was how
that concept could be fairly applied to corporate defendants in a rapidly
changing economy. That led to an extension of the absolute territorial
limits in cases like St. Clair and International Harvester, in which the
Court held that a state could exercise authority over out-of-state corporate
defendants. Ultimately it led to the abolition of the requirement that service
be presented to a corporate defendant’s representative agent within the
forum state. While the Court had held that a single contact could in some
circumstances justify sovereign authority such that a state could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant,173 it did not extend that to
defendants, like Nicastro, that had no contacts with a state. Thus, the
Court’s reliance on the sovereign authority in Nicastro is made clearer
when considered in light of this historical analysis.
Second, consider the plurality’s proposition that personal jurisdiction
is not based on general notions of fairness, divorced from sovereignty
considerations.174 General notions of fairness were originally interjected in
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis in cases like St. Clair in
order to ensure fairness to a sovereign from which a defendant was gaining
benefits.175 That is, fairness was interjected into the personal jurisdiction
analysis only as a measure of the state’s sovereign control over an out-ofstate corporate defendant. It is true that the Court has considered general
notions of fairness from the plaintiff’s perspective when making a personal
jurisdiction determination, but in those instances the Court first found that
the defendant had maintained some contact with the forum state such that
there was a plausible basis for the forum state’s sovereign authority.176 In
light of that historical development, Justice Kennedy’s argument that
personal jurisdiction ought not be based on fairness considerations alone is
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173
174
175
176

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
See 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882).
See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 223–24.
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much better understood to mean that fairness considerations are second to
the overarching importance of sovereign authority.177
D. Response to Scholarly Criticism
The preceding historical, descriptive discussion of the development of
personal jurisdiction as inextricably linked to notions of sovereign authority
also alleviates some of the concerns presented by legal scholars.178 For
example, Borchers argues that International Shoe was meant to base
personal jurisdiction on notions of fairness.179 As discussed earlier, that is
not in fact what the Court’s historical approach to “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice” refers to.180 Rather, the Court in Milliken
adopted that phrase and applied it to mean that when a sovereign has
authority over a defendant it does not offend notions of fair play and justice
to hail that defendant into its courts.181 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s assertion
seems to be the most historically accurate account of identifying the central
concept at play in personal jurisdiction analysis. At the very least, it does
not amount to “a bull-headed attempt to ground personal jurisdiction in a
sovereignty theory.”182 Further, it certainly was not the case that the Court
“hoped to overrule International Shoe and return U.S. jurisdiction to
Pennoyer-era notions of sovereignty and consent.”183 Rather, International
Shoe was much more about sovereignty than Borchers and fellow critics
recognize.
This historical analysis of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine also helps to show why International Shoe was not an important
“shift that put the defendant rather than the state at the center of the
jurisdictional inquiry.”184 Instead, as we have seen, the shift in International
Shoe was merely the Court allowing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporate defendants without service of process on some representative
agent, which had been the prior means of gaining a jurisdictional exception
under Pennoyer’s absolute territorial restrictions doctrine.185 Indeed,
International Shoe and Milliken read together stand for the proposition that
177 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (discussing the conclusion that “jurisdiction is in
the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness”).
178 See supra Section III.B.
179 Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263.
180 See supra Section I.B.
181 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
182 Borchers, supra note 4, at 1263.
183 Id. at 1264.
184 Perdue, supra note 6, at 734.
185 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (citing, inter alia, St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882)).
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a state may properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant when the state
has sovereign authority over the defendant such that it does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The focus is still on
the state’s sovereign power, but the defendant’s conduct and status now
play a more prevalent role in determining where there is a sufficient
relationship with a forum state such that sovereign authority may be
properly exercised.
In sum, the historical evolution of the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine shows that some scholars’ criticism concerning the
perplexing nature of the Court’s reliance on sovereign authority in the
personal jurisdiction arena is misplaced. In fact, embracing the Court’s
historical focus on sovereignty helps to create a much more coherent view
of personal jurisdiction doctrine and thus resolves many of the confusing
aspects alleged by those scholars.
CONCLUSION
A historical analysis of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence is a refreshingly clear way to make sense of the oftencriticized doctrine. The Court’s cases from Pennoyer to International Shoe
paint an interesting perspective on the development of the absolute
territorial limitations doctrine laid down by the Court in Pennoyer. Most
interestingly, the doctrine shows the Court grappling with how to deal with
out-of-state defendants who were clearly availing themselves of the
benefits of the state such that the state ought to have some authority over
them. The Court created exceptions to its bright-line rule to deal with those
changing economic circumstances, eventually holding in Milliken that
expanding the authorial reach of the states did not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice when the corporate defendant had
availed itself of the state’s benefits. Understood in this way, International
Shoe’s famous recitation of that proposition underscores International Shoe
not as a shift away from sovereign consideration, but as a novel way of
considering how a state might have the authority to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant.
International Shoe thus helps to explain the Court’s reliance on
notions of sovereignty throughout the latter half of its doctrine, culminating
in Nicastro. Further, this historical understanding shows why Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion was the most faithful to International Shoe’s
tradition. Finally, this historical approach addresses recent scholarly
criticism of the Court’s use of sovereignty. Rather than trying to assert
some antiquated notions of sovereignty as the Court has been accused of,
the Court is merely following the dictates of stare decisis and creating a
705
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coherent historical framework of personal jurisdiction. This historical
approach is thus an important step in understanding the Court’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine.
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